Obraźliwa dla Polaków Ekspozycja w Muzeum Emigrantów w Halifaksie, Kanada
Obraźliwa dla Polaków Ekspozycja w Muzeum Emigrantów w Halifaksie, Kanada
Opublikował/a redakcjawp w dniu 2008-07-22
List do Redakcji
Halifax, Kanada , 21 lipiec 2008
Każdy kto zwiedza wschodnie prowincje Kanady a zwłaszcza Nowa Szkocje, winien odwiedzić w Halifaksie Muzeum Emigrantów mieszczące się w portowym budynku, przy molu zwanym Pier 21. Przez ten budynek w ciągu 50 lat od czasu pierwszej wojny światowej przewinęło się około miliona europejskich emigrantów do Kanady.
Zwiedzający maja możliwość obejrzeć film „dokumentarny” albo raczej artystyczna ilustracje tego co się kiedyś w tym budynku działo, w czasie kiedy emigranci lądowali w Halifaksie.
Jednym z takich symbolicznych emigrantów w pokazanym w tym filmie była mała, 10 letnia, chyba, polska Żydówka, która opowiadała pielęgniarce, że uciekła z Getta i ukrywała się w chrześcijańskiej rodzinie, która ciągle ja straszyła, że jak nie będzie grzeczna to ją oddadzą w ręce „władz”. Widz odnosi wrażenie, że te „władze” są władzami polskimi i to one są odpowiedzialne za tego dziecka tragedię i śmierć jej rodziców. Na zakończenie pielęgniarka uspokaja dziecko, że teraz nie musi się niczego bać i już nigdy jej nie wyślą z powrotem do Polski. Nigdzie w tym filmie nie jest wspomniane o Niemcach albo nawet Nazistach, którzy ostatnio są modnym zastępstwem dla niemieckich zbrodniarzy z okresu wojny. Film ten mocno nas zbulwersował i za namową mej amerykańskiej żony napisałem list protestacyjny do Muzeum Pier 21 jak i prasy kanadyjskiej i odnośnych ambasad, polskiej w Ottawie i kanadyjskiej w Warszawie. Moja reakcja była podyktowana faktem, ze rodzice dwojga moich bliskich przyjaciół z narażeniem własnego i swych dzieci życia, wykradli z Getta i ocalili, dwie miale Żydówki w podobnym wieku do dziewczynki pokazanej we wspomnianym obraźliwym filmie.
Szkalowanie Polski i Polaków ciągle jest w toku na amerykańskim kontynencie i można je znaleźć w najmniej spodziewanych miejscach i okolicznościach, nawet w wydawałoby się w przyjaznej Polakom Kanadzie.
Jeśli ktoś chciałby zasięgnąć więcej informacji z samego źródła, oto jest adres tego Muzeum: Pier 21 Society1055 Marginal RoadHalifax, Nova Scotia B3H 4P6Canada
Telephone Switchboard: (902) 425-7770 Fax: (902) 423-4045Email: info@pier21.ca Dr.inz. Jan Czekajewski
Columbus, Ohio, USA
Członek Polskiego Instytutu Naukowego (PIASA) w NY
janczek@aol.com
Pier 21 Society Staff
Alex Lech BajanCEORAQport Inc.2004 North Monroe StreetArlington Virginia 22207Washington DC AreaUSATEL: 703-528-0114TEL2: 703-652-0993FAX: 703-940-8300sms: 703-485-6619EMAIL: polonia@raqport.comWEB SITE: http://raqport.comReplacement for the SUN COBALT RAQ LINENew Centos BlueQuartz with GUIsupply and global tech support
Polskie obozy koncentracyjne? "Upside Down"
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
Tuesday, July 22, 2008
The Next Big Wave is Breaking
The Next Big Wave is BreakingFannie Mae Freddie Mac and US Mortgage DebtInterview on the Causes of High Oil PricesOn the Global Research News Hour on RBNGeorgia, Washington and Moscow:A Nuclear Geopolitical Poker GameWorld Bank Secret Report confirms Biofuel Cause of World Food CrisisThe Financial Tsunami has not reached its ClimaxCredit Default Swaps:Next Phase of an Unravelling Crisis, 5 June 2008Die nächste Finanzkrise: Credit Default SwapsThe Seed BaronsHow Big Ag, Big Oil & Big GovernmentAre Hijacking the World’s Food SupplyAn Interview with Acres U.S.A. MagazineReview of “Seeds of Destruction” in Teheran Times The hidden agenda of genetic manipulationPERHAPS 60% OF TODAY'SOIL PRICE IS PURE SPECULATIONMore on the real reason behind high oil prices / Part II(2 & 21 May, 2008 - Also published in Global Research and Financial Sense and Asia Times Online)60 Years After Kennan: The Good Empire in AgonyRussian TV Docu in 5 Parts Made Legible for English-SpeakersTitanic Shift in Global Capital Market Power Why Bush Watergated Eliot SpitzerThe Financial TsunamiRecent Interview on the Financial Tsunami and the Titanic ShiftThe Financial Tsunami Part V: The Predators had a BallBy F. William Engdahl, 22 February 2008By F. William Engdahl, February 8, 2008Part I: Sub-Prime Mortgage Debt is but the Tip of the Iceberg F William Engdahl, November 23, 2007Part II: The Financial Foundations of the American CenturyF William Engdahl, January 16, 2008Part III: Greenspan’s Grand DesignBy F. William Engdahl, January 22, 2008Part IV: Asset Securitization-- The Last Tango
Saturday, July 19, 2008
Paderewski plays Chopin
Paderewski plays Chopin
Bravo!!
This is the truth tradition of Europian music philosophy and interpretation...
There are technical mistakes, but this is the top of our culture...
But today It's changing with all the pianists from China and Korea...
A true superstar of his generation, Paderewski's love for Poland was almost matched by his love of America. FDR made a special exemption for him to be entombed inside the USS Maine memorial at Arlington cemetary until Poland was again free. However, Paderewski's will required that his heart stay here in America. Poland now has him back, but America has his heart.
Simply beautiful, not only the music, the silence in this performance is equally important. Nothing here is accidental, everything is mastered with the higher potential, Paderwski reigns
Bravo!!
This is the truth tradition of Europian music philosophy and interpretation...
There are technical mistakes, but this is the top of our culture...
But today It's changing with all the pianists from China and Korea...
A true superstar of his generation, Paderewski's love for Poland was almost matched by his love of America. FDR made a special exemption for him to be entombed inside the USS Maine memorial at Arlington cemetary until Poland was again free. However, Paderewski's will required that his heart stay here in America. Poland now has him back, but America has his heart.
Simply beautiful, not only the music, the silence in this performance is equally important. Nothing here is accidental, everything is mastered with the higher potential, Paderwski reigns
Finansowa katastrofa?
Finansowa katastrofa?
red. Małgorzata Goss (2008-07-18)
Aktualności dnia
słuchajzapisz
Zobacz również inne publikacje związane z tym tematem:
AUDYCJE:
Finansowa katastrofa? - [2008-07-18]red. Małgorzata Goss
ARTYKUŁY:
Nadciąga finansowa katastrofa - [2008-07-17]
Finanse w pułapce demografii - [2008-07-17]
red. Małgorzata Goss (2008-07-18)
Aktualności dnia
słuchajzapisz
Zobacz również inne publikacje związane z tym tematem:
AUDYCJE:
Finansowa katastrofa? - [2008-07-18]red. Małgorzata Goss
ARTYKUŁY:
Nadciąga finansowa katastrofa - [2008-07-17]
Finanse w pułapce demografii - [2008-07-17]
Thursday, July 17, 2008
Jako Polak z USA Washington DC 20 lat przekazuje najlepsze dla Ludzi Gromu
Jako Polak z USA Washington DC 20 lat przekazuje najlepsze dla Ludzi Gromu
wchoraj spotkalem amerykana, jedzie do Afganistanu za 2 tyg. byl z wami IRAQ, tezaz ma brode, jak rodem z Aganistanu przekazal zyczenia dla Gromu. Powiedzial ze Polacy z Grom to nalepsi z najlepszych. Nie dal mi zaplacic rachunku. Mialem lzy w oczach. =Dziekuje Grom co robicie dla Polski. To nie jest dla partii ale dla nas i dla Polski.
Statek Polish Ship Stefan Czrnecki nie mogl doplynac na czas bo nie bylo zgody USA
Wojsko Polskie - GROM - Irak 2002-2004 (2)
wchoraj spotkalem amerykana, jedzie do Afganistanu za 2 tyg. byl z wami IRAQ, tezaz ma brode, jak rodem z Aganistanu przekazal zyczenia dla Gromu. Powiedzial ze Polacy z Grom to nalepsi z najlepszych. Nie dal mi zaplacic rachunku. Mialem lzy w oczach. =Dziekuje Grom co robicie dla Polski. To nie jest dla partii ale dla nas i dla Polski.
Statek Polish Ship Stefan Czrnecki nie mogl doplynac na czas bo nie bylo zgody USA
Wojsko Polskie - GROM - Irak 2002-2004 (2)
Tuesday, July 8, 2008
The Folly of Attacking Iran Lessons from History
The Folly of Attacking Iran Lessons from History
Mossadeq and Oil Nationalization
From 1949 on, sentiment for nationalization of Iran's oil industry grew. In 1949 the Majlis approved the First Development Plan (1948-55), which called for comprehensive agricultural and industrial development of the country. The Plan Organization was established to administer the program, which was to be financed in large part from oil revenues. Politically conscious Iranians were aware, however, that the British government derived more revenue from taxing the concessionaire, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC--formerly the Anglo-Persian Oil Company), than the Iranian government derived from royalties. The oil issue figured prominently in elections for the Majlis in 1949, and nationalists in the new Majlis were determined to renegotiate the AIOC agreement. In November 1950, the Majlis committee concerned with oil matters, headed by Mossadeq, rejected a draft agreement in which the AIOC had offered the government slightly improved terms. These terms did not include the fifty-fifty profit-sharing provision that was part of other new Persian Gulf oil concessions.
Subsequent negotiations with the AIOC were unsuccessful, partly because General Ali Razmara, who became prime minister in June 1950, failed to persuade the oil company of the strength of nationalist feeling in the country and in the Majlis. When the AIOC finally offered fifty-fifty profit-sharing in February 1951, sentiment for nationalization of the oil industry had become widespread. Razmara advised against nationalization on technical grounds and was assassinated in March 1951 by Khalil Tahmasebi, a member of the militant Fadayan-e Islam. On March 15, the Majlis voted to nationalize the oil industry. In April the shah yielded to Majlis pressure and demonstrations in the streets by naming Mossadeq prime minister.
Oil production came to a virtual standstill as British technicians left the country, and Britain imposed a worldwide embargo on the purchase of Iranian oil. In September 1951, Britain froze Iran's sterling assets and banned export of goods to Iran. It challenged the legality of the oil nationalization and took its case against Iran to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The court found in Iran's favor, but the dispute between Iran and the AIOC remained unsettled. Under United States pressure, the AIOC improved its offer to Iran. The excitement generated by the nationalization issue, anti-British feeling, agitation by radical elements, and the conviction among Mossadeq's advisers that Iran's maximum demands would, in the end, be met, however, led the government to reject all offers. The economy began to suffer from the loss of foreign exchange and oil revenues.
Meanwhile, Mossadeq's growing popularity and power led to political chaos and eventual United States intervention. Mossadeq had come to office on the strength of support from the National Front and other parties in the Majlis and as a result of his great popularity. His popularity, growing power, and intransigence on the oil issue were creating friction between the prime minister and the shah. In the summer of 1952, the shah refused the prime minister's demand for the power to appoint the minister of war (and, by implication, to control the armed forces). Mossadeq resigned, three days of pro-Mossadeq rioting followed, and the shah was forced to reappoint Mossadeq to head the government.
As domestic conditions deteriorated, however, Mossadeq's populist style grew more autocratic. In August 1952, the Majlis acceded to his demand for full powers in all affairs of government for a six-month period. These special powers were subsequently extended for a further six-month term. He also obtained approval for a law to reduce, from six years to two years, the term of the Senate (established in 1950 as the upper house of the Majlis), and thus brought about the dissolution of that body. Mossadeq's support in the lower house of the Majlis (also called the Majlis) was dwindling, however, so on August 3, 1953, the prime minister organized a plebiscite for the dissolution of the Majlis, claimed a massive vote in favor of the proposal, and dissolved the legislative body.
The administration of President Harry S Truman initially had been sympathetic to Iran's nationalist aspirations. Under the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, however, the United States came to accept the view of the British government that no reasonable compromise with Mossadeq was possible and that, by working with the Tudeh, Mossadeq was making probable a communist-inspired takeover. Mossadeq's intransigence and inclination to accept Tudeh support, the Cold War atmosphere, and the fear of Soviet influence in Iran also shaped United States thinking. In June 1953, the Eisenhower administration approved a British proposal for a joint Anglo-American operation, code-named Operation Ajax, to overthrow Mossadeq. Kermit Roosevelt of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) traveled secretly to Iran to coordinate plans with the shah and the Iranian military, which was led by General Fazlollah Zahedi.
In accord with the plan, on August 13 the shah appointed Zahedi prime minister to replace Mossadeq. Mossadeq refused to step down and arrested the shah's emissary. This triggered the second stage of Operation Ajax, which called for a military coup. The plan initially seemed to have failed, the shah fled the country, and Zahedi went into hiding. After four days of rioting, however, the tide turned. On August 19, pro-shah army units and street crowds defeated Mossadeq's forces. The shah returned to the country. Mossadeq was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for trying to overthrow the monarchy, but he was subsequently allowed to remain under house arrest in his village outside Tehran until his death in 1967. His minister of foreign affairs, Hosain Fatemi, was sentenced to death and executed. Hundreds of National Front leaders, Tudeh Party officers, and political activists were arrested; several Tudeh army officers were also sentenced to death.
Mossadeq and Oil Nationalization
From 1949 on, sentiment for nationalization of Iran's oil industry grew. In 1949 the Majlis approved the First Development Plan (1948-55), which called for comprehensive agricultural and industrial development of the country. The Plan Organization was established to administer the program, which was to be financed in large part from oil revenues. Politically conscious Iranians were aware, however, that the British government derived more revenue from taxing the concessionaire, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC--formerly the Anglo-Persian Oil Company), than the Iranian government derived from royalties. The oil issue figured prominently in elections for the Majlis in 1949, and nationalists in the new Majlis were determined to renegotiate the AIOC agreement. In November 1950, the Majlis committee concerned with oil matters, headed by Mossadeq, rejected a draft agreement in which the AIOC had offered the government slightly improved terms. These terms did not include the fifty-fifty profit-sharing provision that was part of other new Persian Gulf oil concessions.
Subsequent negotiations with the AIOC were unsuccessful, partly because General Ali Razmara, who became prime minister in June 1950, failed to persuade the oil company of the strength of nationalist feeling in the country and in the Majlis. When the AIOC finally offered fifty-fifty profit-sharing in February 1951, sentiment for nationalization of the oil industry had become widespread. Razmara advised against nationalization on technical grounds and was assassinated in March 1951 by Khalil Tahmasebi, a member of the militant Fadayan-e Islam. On March 15, the Majlis voted to nationalize the oil industry. In April the shah yielded to Majlis pressure and demonstrations in the streets by naming Mossadeq prime minister.
Oil production came to a virtual standstill as British technicians left the country, and Britain imposed a worldwide embargo on the purchase of Iranian oil. In September 1951, Britain froze Iran's sterling assets and banned export of goods to Iran. It challenged the legality of the oil nationalization and took its case against Iran to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The court found in Iran's favor, but the dispute between Iran and the AIOC remained unsettled. Under United States pressure, the AIOC improved its offer to Iran. The excitement generated by the nationalization issue, anti-British feeling, agitation by radical elements, and the conviction among Mossadeq's advisers that Iran's maximum demands would, in the end, be met, however, led the government to reject all offers. The economy began to suffer from the loss of foreign exchange and oil revenues.
Meanwhile, Mossadeq's growing popularity and power led to political chaos and eventual United States intervention. Mossadeq had come to office on the strength of support from the National Front and other parties in the Majlis and as a result of his great popularity. His popularity, growing power, and intransigence on the oil issue were creating friction between the prime minister and the shah. In the summer of 1952, the shah refused the prime minister's demand for the power to appoint the minister of war (and, by implication, to control the armed forces). Mossadeq resigned, three days of pro-Mossadeq rioting followed, and the shah was forced to reappoint Mossadeq to head the government.
As domestic conditions deteriorated, however, Mossadeq's populist style grew more autocratic. In August 1952, the Majlis acceded to his demand for full powers in all affairs of government for a six-month period. These special powers were subsequently extended for a further six-month term. He also obtained approval for a law to reduce, from six years to two years, the term of the Senate (established in 1950 as the upper house of the Majlis), and thus brought about the dissolution of that body. Mossadeq's support in the lower house of the Majlis (also called the Majlis) was dwindling, however, so on August 3, 1953, the prime minister organized a plebiscite for the dissolution of the Majlis, claimed a massive vote in favor of the proposal, and dissolved the legislative body.
The administration of President Harry S Truman initially had been sympathetic to Iran's nationalist aspirations. Under the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, however, the United States came to accept the view of the British government that no reasonable compromise with Mossadeq was possible and that, by working with the Tudeh, Mossadeq was making probable a communist-inspired takeover. Mossadeq's intransigence and inclination to accept Tudeh support, the Cold War atmosphere, and the fear of Soviet influence in Iran also shaped United States thinking. In June 1953, the Eisenhower administration approved a British proposal for a joint Anglo-American operation, code-named Operation Ajax, to overthrow Mossadeq. Kermit Roosevelt of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) traveled secretly to Iran to coordinate plans with the shah and the Iranian military, which was led by General Fazlollah Zahedi.
In accord with the plan, on August 13 the shah appointed Zahedi prime minister to replace Mossadeq. Mossadeq refused to step down and arrested the shah's emissary. This triggered the second stage of Operation Ajax, which called for a military coup. The plan initially seemed to have failed, the shah fled the country, and Zahedi went into hiding. After four days of rioting, however, the tide turned. On August 19, pro-shah army units and street crowds defeated Mossadeq's forces. The shah returned to the country. Mossadeq was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for trying to overthrow the monarchy, but he was subsequently allowed to remain under house arrest in his village outside Tehran until his death in 1967. His minister of foreign affairs, Hosain Fatemi, was sentenced to death and executed. Hundreds of National Front leaders, Tudeh Party officers, and political activists were arrested; several Tudeh army officers were also sentenced to death.
Monday, July 7, 2008
The Shock Doctrine by Alfonso Cuarón and Naomi Klein
The Shock Doctrine by Alfonso Cuarón and Naomi Klein
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)